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Corporations Act s606/611 & s640, per ASIC RG 111 & RG 112
Why Independent Expert Reports Matter
When a transaction puts a target’s shareholders in a position where they must vote on, or accept, a proposal that the people asking for their support have an interest in, the Corporations Act requires an independent voice. An independent expert report is that voice: an assessment, prepared by someone with no stake in the outcome, of whether the proposal is fair and reasonable, or in the best interests of the shareholders being asked to approve it.
The report is not a formality appended to a scheme booklet. It is the document non-associated shareholders rely on most heavily, the document ASIC reads first when it reviews disclosure, and — where a transaction is later challenged — the document that establishes whether the directors discharged their duty to inform shareholders properly. A report that reaches a defensible conclusion on transparent reasoning supports the transaction. One that is thin on methodology, silent on a material assumption, or compromised on independence invites ASIC intervention, delays the meeting, and in a contested situation hands the other side its argument.
The requirements are demanding by design. ASIC Regulatory Guide 111 sets out how the expert must analyse the transaction and what “fair and reasonable” means for each transaction type; RG 112 governs the expert’s independence and is applied strictly. Both are enforced through ASIC’s review of the transaction documents, and neither leaves much room for a report that has not been prepared to the standard from the outset.
Important: preparing an independent expert report for a Corporations Act purpose is a financial service. The expert must hold an Australian Financial Services Licence covering that service, or be an authorised representative of a licensee. Any engagement in this area must be structured accordingly — this page describes the framework and the valuation work behind these reports, and firms considering this work should confirm their own licensing position before accepting an engagement.
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When an Independent Expert Report Is Required
Section 611 item 7 — Shareholder-Approved Acquisitions
Section 606 prohibits a person from acquiring a relevant interest in the voting shares of a listed or widely-held company where the acquisition takes their voting power above 20%, or from a starting point above 20% and below 90% to a higher figure. The takeovers rules exist so that control passes in an orderly way with equal opportunity for all holders.
Item 7 of section 611 provides an exception where the acquisition is approved by a resolution of shareholders, with no votes cast by the acquirer or its associates. For that approval to be informed, the notice of meeting must include all information known to the acquirer and the target that is material to the decision.
In practice, ASIC’s position in RG 74 is that non-associated shareholders should be given either an independent expert report, or a directors’ statement with detailed reasons, on whether the proposed acquisition is fair and reasonable. An independent expert report is the standard approach, and effectively expected where the directors have any interest in the outcome.
Section 640 — Takeover Bids
Where a takeover bid is made, section 640 requires the target’s statement to include an independent expert report where:
- The bidder’s voting power in the target is 30% or more, or
- The bidder and the target have a common director
The report must state whether the expert considers the offer fair and reasonable, and give reasons. Where those thresholds are not met, the directors must still give a recommendation with reasons, and many boards commission an expert report voluntarily to support it.
Schemes of Arrangement — Part 5.1
For a members’ scheme of arrangement, the scheme booklet must be registered with ASIC and contain the information prescribed by the Corporations Regulations, including an independent expert report where the acquirer holds an interest of 30% or more or there is a common director, and in practice for most control schemes regardless.
For a scheme, the expert opines on whether the scheme is in the best interests of members — a different formulation from the takeover test, which matters in how the analysis is structured.
Other Circumstances
Independent expert reports are also commonly required or expected for:
- Related party transactions by listed entities requiring shareholder approval under ASX Listing Rule 10.1
- Selective capital reductions and share buy-backs where the terms may not treat holders equally
- Compulsory acquisitions following a bid, where the expert opines on whether the consideration is fair value
- Article and constitutional changes affecting class rights
- Demergers and in-specie distributions
RG 111 — The Analytical Framework
Regulatory Guide 111 is the operative guidance on how an expert must reach a conclusion. Its central structure is the separation of “fair” from “reasonable”.
“Fair” — A Value Comparison
An offer is fair if the value of the consideration offered is equal to or greater than the value of the securities being acquired.
Two points define this test:
Control basis on one side. The value of the target’s securities is assessed on a control basis — including the full value of the entity, with the synergies and premium available to a controlling holder — even though the individual shareholder holds a non-controlling parcel. RG 111 is explicit that comparing a portfolio-basis target value with the offer price understates the target and is not the test.
Minority basis on the other, where scrip is offered. Where consideration includes scrip in the bidder, the value of that scrip is assessed on a minority or portfolio basis, since that is what the target shareholder actually receives.
The asymmetry is deliberate and it is the reason many scrip-for-scrip transactions are assessed as not fair, but reasonable.
“Reasonable” — Everything Else
An offer is reasonable if it is fair. It may also be reasonable despite being not fair, where there are sufficient other considerations. RG 111 identifies factors including:
- The bidder’s existing shareholding and practical level of control
- Any significant shareholding blocks other than the bidder’s
- The liquidity of the target’s securities and the likelihood of an alternative offer
- The consequences of the offer not proceeding, including the target’s financial position and funding requirements
- The likely market price of the securities if the offer lapses
- Any special value of the target to the bidder not available to others
- The value to an alternative bidder and the prospects of a competing proposal
A “not fair but reasonable” conclusion is a legitimate and reasonably common outcome. It requires the report to set out clearly why the other considerations outweigh the value shortfall — which is where a report either persuades or does not.
“In the Best Interests of Members” — The Scheme Test
For a scheme of arrangement, RG 111 directs the expert to reach a view on whether the scheme is in the best interests of members. Where the scheme is a control transaction, the expert should analyse it as if it were a takeover bid — applying the fair and reasonable analysis — and conclude that it is in the best interests of members if it is either fair and reasonable, or not fair but reasonable.
Where the scheme is not a control transaction, the expert weighs the advantages and disadvantages against the alternatives, including the status quo.
Valuation Approach Requirements
RG 111 expects the expert to apply methodologies appropriate to the entity and the transaction, and to explain the selection:
Discounted cash flow — Appropriate where reliable forecasts are available. The report must disclose the key assumptions, the discount rate and its derivation, terminal value assumptions, and sensitivity analysis.
Capitalisation of earnings — Applying multiples derived from comparable listed companies and comparable transactions to a maintainable earnings figure, with the normalisation adjustments explained.
Net assets or realisable value — For asset-holding entities, entities in wind-down, or as a cross-check.
Quoted market price — For listed targets, the market price is relevant evidence, but it reflects portfolio value rather than control value. RG 111 expects the expert to address the difference and to consider whether the market for the securities is sufficiently liquid and informed for the price to be meaningful.
Control premium — Where the expert moves from a portfolio basis to a control basis, the premium applied must be supported by evidence, typically from observed premiums in comparable Australian transactions, rather than a conventional percentage applied without derivation.
A valuation range, not a point estimate — RG 111 expects the expert to express a range and to state where within the range the offer falls.
RG 112 — Independence
Regulatory Guide 112 governs the expert’s independence, and it is applied strictly. An expert must be, and be seen to be, independent of the parties and the transaction.
What Compromises Independence
Financial interests — Any shareholding, option or other interest in either party, held by the expert firm, its partners or the individuals involved.
Fee structure — The fee must not be contingent on the outcome of the transaction or on the conclusion reached. A success fee, or a fee payable only if the transaction completes, is disqualifying.
Prior involvement in the transaction — The expert must not have advised on the structuring, negotiation or pricing of the transaction. This is the most common practical disqualifier: the firm that advised the board on the deal cannot then write the independent report on it.
Prior and concurrent relationships — Recent audit, advisory or valuation engagements for either party require assessment and disclosure. Long-standing relationships that create a perception of alignment can be disqualifying even where no financial interest exists.
Business relationships and referral arrangements — Including arrangements with the parties’ advisers.
What the Report Must Disclose
RG 112 requires the report to state the expert’s qualifications and relevant experience, the basis and amount of the fee, any relationship with the parties in the preceding two years, any interest in the outcome, who instructed the expert and who is paying, and a declaration of independence.
The expert must also confirm they have had access to all information reasonably required and identify any material limitation on the work performed. An expert who has been denied access to information material to the conclusion must say so in the report.
Who Appoints the Expert
The expert should be appointed by the party that must provide the report to shareholders — in a takeover, the target’s directors; in a section 611 approval, typically the non-associated directors or an independent board committee. Appointment by the acquirer, or by a party with an interest in the conclusion, undermines the report regardless of how the work is performed.
What Goes Wrong
- Fair test applied on a portfolio basis, comparing the offer to an undiscounted market or minority value rather than a control value
- Control premium asserted without evidence, or a conventional percentage applied with no derivation from comparable transactions
- “Not fair but reasonable” concluded without adequate reasoning, leaving shareholders unable to assess why the other considerations outweigh the shortfall
- Scrip consideration valued on a control basis, overstating what the target shareholder receives
- A point estimate instead of a range, or a range so wide it conveys nothing
- Undisclosed prior involvement in advising on the transaction
- Forecasts adopted without assessment — management forecasts used as inputs without the expert forming and disclosing a view on their reasonableness
- Special value to the bidder not addressed, where synergies available only to that acquirer are material to the assessment
- Information limitations not disclosed, where access to material information was restricted
- Late engagement, leaving insufficient time for the work and for ASIC’s review of the document
The Timetable
Independent expert reports sit on the critical path of a transaction, and the timetable is unforgiving.
For a scheme of arrangement, the booklet including the expert’s report must be lodged with ASIC before the first court hearing, and ASIC has a statutory period to consider it. For a takeover, the target’s statement including the report must be given within the prescribed period after the bidder’s statement. In both cases, ASIC comments on the expert’s report are a common cause of delay, and a report that requires substantive revision after lodgement can move the meeting date.
Engagement well before lodgement is therefore not a preference but a practical requirement. The valuation work itself takes time; the interaction with the company’s forecasts, the assessment of their reasonableness, and the sensitivity analysis all take longer where the expert is engaged late and working against the timetable.
The Valuation Work Behind an Independent Expert Report
Whether or not a firm holds the licence to sign the report itself, the substance of an independent expert report is a valuation exercise, and it is the valuation that determines whether the conclusion holds.
Control-basis enterprise and equity valuation — Applying DCF, capitalisation of earnings, and asset-based approaches as appropriate, expressed as a range, with the methodology selection reasoned rather than asserted.
Comparable company and transaction analysis — Trading multiples from genuinely comparable listed peers and multiples implied by comparable Australian transactions, with the comparability of each explained rather than a list presented without commentary.
Control premium derivation — From observed premiums in comparable transactions in the same market, sized to the specific circumstances rather than applied as a convention.
Assessment of forecasts — Reviewing management’s projections against historical performance, industry conditions and the entity’s forecasting record, and forming a disclosable view on their reasonableness.
Scrip valuation on the correct basis — Where the consideration includes securities in the acquirer, valued on a minority basis, including where the acquirer is itself unlisted.
Sensitivity and scenario analysis — Showing how the conclusion moves with the key assumptions, which is both an RG 111 expectation and the part shareholders can actually use.
Special value and synergies — Identifying value available only to the specific acquirer, and addressing how it bears on the assessment.
Documentation to withstand review — Every assumption sourced, every judgement explained, structured for ASIC’s review of the document and for scrutiny in a contested transaction.
InteleK’s accredited valuation specialists work alongside transaction counsel, corporate advisers and, where required, the licensed expert — providing the valuation analysis that independent expert conclusions rest on.
Independent Expert Report FAQs
Expert insights into RG 111 and RG 112 — the fair and reasonable tests, control premiums, scrip valuation, and independence requirements in 2026.
⚠️ General information only, and not legal advice. Preparing an independent expert report for a Corporations Act purpose is a financial service requiring an AFS licence. InteleK Business Valuations & Advisory Pty Ltd recommends you engage transaction counsel and a licensed expert for any transaction requiring a report.
Search 2026 Independent Expert Report Topics
It is an assessment, prepared by someone with no interest in the outcome, of whether a proposed transaction is fair and reasonable, or in the best interests of the shareholders being asked to approve it. It exists because in a control transaction or a related party dealing, the people asking shareholders for support have an interest in the answer. The report is the document non-associated shareholders rely on most, the one ASIC reads first when reviewing the transaction documents, and — if the transaction is later challenged — the evidence that directors informed shareholders properly.
Section 640 requires the target's statement to include an independent expert report where the bidder's voting power in the target is at or above the prescribed threshold, or where the bidder and target share a common director. Where neither applies, the directors must still give a recommendation with reasons — and many boards commission a report voluntarily to support it, particularly where any director has an interest in the outcome. Confirm the current threshold and the timing requirements with transaction counsel, as these are prescribed and the target's statement must be given within a set period.
Section 606 prohibits acquisitions that take a person's voting power above the takeover threshold. Item 7 of section 611 provides an exception where shareholders approve the acquisition, with no votes cast by the acquirer or its associates. For that approval to be informed, the notice of meeting must contain all information material to the decision. ASIC's position is that non-associated shareholders should receive either an independent expert report or a detailed directors' statement on whether the acquisition is fair and reasonable. An expert report is the standard approach, and effectively expected where the directors have any interest in the outcome.
RG 111 separates them deliberately. An offer is fair if the value of the consideration offered is equal to or greater than the value of the securities being acquired — purely a value comparison. Reasonableness is everything else: an offer is reasonable if it is fair, but it may also be reasonable despite being not fair where other considerations are sufficient. Those considerations include the bidder's existing level of practical control, the liquidity of the securities, the likelihood of an alternative offer, the consequences if the offer lapses, and the likely market price in that event.
Because that is what the fair test requires. RG 111 directs the expert to assess the value of the target's securities on a control basis — the full value of the entity, including the synergies and premium available to a controlling holder — even though the individual shareholder holds a non-controlling parcel. Comparing the offer price to a portfolio or minority value of the target understates it and is not the test. This is one of the more common technical errors, and it produces a conclusion that flatters the offer.
On a minority or portfolio basis — because a minority parcel in the bidder is what the target shareholder actually receives. That creates a deliberate asymmetry with the target side of the comparison, which is assessed on a control basis, and it is the reason many scrip-for-scrip transactions are assessed as not fair. Valuing the scrip on a control basis overstates what shareholders are getting and is a recurring error. Where the bidder is itself unlisted, the scrip valuation becomes a substantial piece of work in its own right.
No — it is a legitimate and reasonably common outcome, particularly in scrip transactions and where the bidder already holds effective control. What matters is the reasoning. The report has to set out clearly why the other considerations outweigh the value shortfall, in terms shareholders can actually weigh. A "not fair but reasonable" conclusion supported by a paragraph of generalities is where reports get challenged; one that sets out the specific alternatives, the consequences of the offer lapsing, and what the securities would likely trade at is defensible.
For a scheme, the expert opines on whether the scheme is in the best interests of members rather than whether it is fair and reasonable. Where the scheme is a control transaction, RG 111 directs the expert to analyse it as if it were a takeover bid, applying the fair and reasonable analysis, and to conclude it is in members' best interests if it is either fair and reasonable, or not fair but reasonable. Where it is not a control transaction, the expert weighs the advantages and disadvantages against the alternatives, including doing nothing.
From evidence, not convention. Where the expert moves from a portfolio basis to a control basis, the premium needs to be derived from observed premiums in comparable transactions in the same market, sized to the specific circumstances of the target and the acquirer. A conventional percentage applied without derivation is one of the more visible weaknesses in a report, because the premium often moves the conclusion — and a figure that cannot be traced to comparable evidence is the first thing a contested party will attack.
As relevant evidence, yes — but not as the answer. The market price reflects portfolio value, not the control value the fair test requires, so the expert has to address the difference explicitly. The expert also needs to consider whether the market in those securities is sufficiently liquid and informed for the price to be meaningful: for a thinly traded small cap, the last traded price may carry very little evidentiary weight, and treating it as a proxy for value is not supportable.
Yes. RG 111 expects a range rather than a point estimate, together with a statement of where within that range the offer falls — that is the information shareholders use. The range has to be meaningful in both directions: a single figure implies a precision the analysis does not support, and a range so wide that the offer sits comfortably inside it conveys nothing and will attract ASIC comment. The report should also include sensitivity analysis showing how the conclusion moves with the key assumptions.
That the expert be independent and be seen to be independent, and it is applied strictly. Disqualifying factors include any financial interest in either party held by the firm, its partners or the individuals involved; a fee contingent on the transaction completing or on the conclusion reached; and prior involvement in structuring, negotiating or pricing the transaction. Recent audit, advisory or valuation engagements for either party require assessment and disclosure. The report must state the expert's qualifications, the fee basis and amount, any relationship with the parties in the recent past, any interest in the outcome, and a declaration of independence.
No. Prior involvement in structuring, negotiating or pricing the transaction is the most common practical disqualifier under RG 112 — the firm that advised the board on the deal cannot then write the independent report on it. Nor can the expert be appointed by the acquirer or by any party with an interest in the conclusion. The appointment should come from the party required to provide the report to shareholders: the target's directors in a takeover, or the non-associated directors or an independent board committee in a section 611 approval.
Not without forming and disclosing a view on them. Where a discounted cash flow is used, the expert has to assess management's projections against historical performance, industry conditions and the entity's forecasting track record, and say what they concluded. Adopting forecasts as given, with no assessment, is a substantive weakness — particularly where the forecasts drive the valuation and the party that prepared them has an interest in the outcome. The expert must also disclose any material limitation on the information they were given, including where access was restricted.
Well before lodgement, because the report sits on the transaction's critical path and the timetable is unforgiving. The documents containing the report must be lodged with ASIC, which then has a period to consider them, and ASIC comments on the expert's report are a common cause of delay — a report needing substantive revision after lodgement can move the meeting date. The valuation work itself takes time, and the assessment of forecasts and the sensitivity analysis take longer where the expert is engaged late and working against the clock. Get the specific timetable from transaction counsel at the outset.
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